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The question of whether investor sentiment affects asset prices has been actively 
debated in the finance literature. This master´s thesis examines the effect of investor risk 
appetite on asset returns in the market segment that has not received much attention in 
the existing literature; investment grade government bonds.  
In order to identify the impact of investor sentiment, this study controls the effects of 
time-varying fundamentals by focusing on the yield spreads to Germany in 10-year 
government bonds of other triple-A-rated Eurozone countries. The main finding of the 
empirical analysis is that the sovereign yield spreads are positively related to the level of 
risk aversion.    
This study applies fairly recent and novel measure for investor risk aversion, the equity 
variance premium that is obtained with a decomposition method developed by Bekaert and 
Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013). The variance premium for European financial markets is 
defined as a difference between the squared VDAX index and an estimate of the conditional 
variance of the German stock market, the DAX index. The decomposition of the volatility 
index provides measures for investor risk appetite and expected stock market uncertainty 
which have been identified as important drivers of asset price dynamics in recent structural 
dynamic asset pricing literature. 
The results suggest that during the times of low investor risk appetite, the sovereign 
yield spreads to Germany increase. This finding holds for both pre- and post-crisis periods 
and also when the identification assumption of constant fundamental based risk premium 
to Germany is relaxed by controlling the differences in CDS (credit default swap) prices.   
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Markkinasentimentin ja arvopaperien hintojen välinen yhteys on ollut pitkään 
rahoitusmarkkinatutkimuksen mielenkiinnon kohteena. Tämä maisterintutkielma 
käsittelee sijoittajien riskinottohalukkuuden vaikutuksia matalan luottoriskin omaavien 
valtionlainojen hintoihin. Kyseinen markkinasegmentti on jäänyt aiemmissa 
tutkimuksissa verrattain vähälle huomiolle. 
Tutkielman empiirinen analyysi keskittyy 10-vuoden valtionlainojen tuottoeroihin 
AAA-luottoluokituksen omaavien euromaiden ja Saksan välillä. Tällä tavoin pyritään 
kontrolloimaan ajassa muuttuvat fundamenttitekijät ja identifioimaan sijoittajien 
riskiaversion vaikutukset valtionlainojen tuottovaatimukseen. Tutkielmassa havaitaan että 
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merkitystä modernit rakenteelliset ja dynaamiset hinnoittelumallit ovat korostaneet 
arvopaperien hinnanmuodostuksessa.  
Tutkimuksen mukaan matalan riskinottohalukkuuden aikoina valtioluottojen korkoerot 
suhteessa Saksaan kasvavat. Tämä tulos pätee sekä viimeisintä finanssikriisiä edeltäneenä 
että sitä seuranneena ajanjaksona. Positiivinen yhteys korkoerojen ja riskiaversion välillä 
säilyy myös silloin kun fundamenttiperusteisen tuottoeron sallitaan muuttua ajassa 
kontrolloimalla CDS (credit default swap)-hintojen erot suhteessa Saksaan.   
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1 Introduction 
 
The question of whether investor sentiment affects asset prices has been actively debated in 
the finance literature.  After the historical price run-up in the US stock markets and 
subsequent collapse in the late 1920´s, John Maynard Keynes argued that markets can be 
affected from investors’ animal spirits, which move prices in a way unrelated to 
fundamentals. According to classical asset pricing theories, asset returns are determined by 
rational expectations on changes in economic fundamentals. In contrast, the behavioral 
branch of literature suggests that the sentiment and trading behavior of market participants 
significantly affect asset returns in financial markets (see e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2007 and 
Brown and Cliff, 2004). Recently, structural dynamic asset pricing models, such as 
Campbell and Cochrane, 1999 and Bansal and Yaron, 2004, also identifies risk aversion and 
economic uncertainty as important drivers of asset price dynamics.  
 A bulk of empirical studies find that investor sentiment significantly affects stock 
returns (see e.g. Brown and Cliff, 2004, Brown and Cliff, 2005, Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 
Baker and Wurgler, 2007, Schmeling, 2009 and Baker et al., 2012). While the majority of 
studies focus on the stock markets, some authors such as Blommestein et al. (2012) and De 
Grauwe and Ji (2013) consider that during the latest European sovereign debt crisis the 
increase in yield spreads in sovereign bonds was more driven by market sentiment than 
expected fundamentals. 
 This master´s thesis examines the effect of investor risk appetite on asset returns in 
the market segment that has not received much attention in the existing literature; investment 
grade government bonds. In order to identify the impact of investor sentiment, this study 
controls the effects of time-varying fundamentals by focusing on the yield spread to 
Germany in 10-year government bonds of other triple-A-rated Eurozone countries. 
Compared to previous studies on determinants of sovereign yield spreads (see e.g. 
Schuknecht et al., 2010 and De Grauwe and Ji, 2013), this design does not require the 
inclusion of low frequency macroeconomic or fiscal variables, and hence it allows to conduct 
the analysis with daily data.  
 The identification strategy stems to the fact that investment grade sovereign bonds 
have been considered as the safest assets in the world (Fontana and Scheicher, 2016). Due 
to concave payoff pattern of the debt claim (Hong and Sraer, 2013), it could be expected that 
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the difference in default risk between Germany and triple-A-tranche Euro-sovereigns should 
not be much affected by idiosyncratic fiscal or macroeconomic developments. If the investor 
holds the bond to the maturity, the expected nominal return from the investment is likely to 
be certain. From the historical perspective it is extremely unlikely that a country with triple-
A-rating ends up to default during the next 10 year period. In addition the analyzed countries 
have common monetary policy and hence, the yield spreads do not contain exchange rate 
risk. Intuitively this empirical design relates to Froot`s and Dabora`s (1999) study on 
mispricing between twin-companies.  
 This master´s thesis contributes to the existing literature by providing new evidence 
that the sentiment phenomena can be observed also in the asset class that is often considered 
as a safe haven in the European financial markets. The main finding of this study is that the 
sovereign yield spreads are positively related to the level of risk aversion, which is line with 
theoretical prediction of presented consumption based asset pricing model. 
 Previous studies often utilize volatility index (such VIX for US stock markets) as a 
proxy for investor sentiment (Bekaert and Hoerova, and Lo Duca, 2013). Recent literature, 
however, suggests that volatility index harbors information on both risk aversion and 
uncertainty (see e.g. Carr and Wu, 2009). This study applies fairly recent and novel measure 
for investor risk aversion, the equity variance premium that is obtained with a decomposition 
method developed by Bekaert and Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013).  
 The variance premium for European financial markets is defined as a difference 
between the squared VDAX index and an estimate of the conditional variance of the German 
stock market, the DAX index. The decomposition of the volatility index provides a measures 
for investor risk appetite and expected stock market uncertainty. The descriptive validation 
of these measures shows that during the analyzed time period, from 2002 to 2014, both 
measures are highly correlated with the observed flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity 
tendencies. These phenome have been traditionally associated with changes in investor 
sentiment in the market place.  
 The results suggest that during the times of low investor risk appetite, the sovereign 
yield spreads to Germany increase. This finding holds for both pre- and post-crisis periods 
and also when the identification assumption of constant fundamental based risk premium to 
Germany is relaxed by controlling the differences in CDS (credit default swap) prices. The 
positive relationship between risk aversion and spreads seems to be robust and persistent 
during the analyzed time period from 2002 to 2014. Moreover, the estimated magnitude of 
the effect of investor sentiment is economically significant. For example, if the risk aversion 
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measure increases by one standard deviation from its average level, which is fairly common 
movement during the sample period, the average yield spread to Germany increases by 20 
percent points. In relative terms, this increase would result over 5 percent points higher 
average sovereign borrowing costs compared to Germany for the analyzed triple-A-rated 
countries. In 2008, when the risk aversion reached its highest levels, the average impact of 
the investor sentiment was over 40 basis points which corresponds about 10 percent points 
higher sovereign borrowing costs compared to Germany in long maturity government bonds. 
 In order to study the causal link between risk aversion, uncertainty and spreads, the 
VAR analysis is also conducted. It is plausible that the regression analysis suffers from the 
endogeneity problem that might arise for example from the fact that the spreads could also 
reflect the expectations on the future of the euro system. It might be the case that the yield 
spreads in the Eurozone´s sovereign debt markets are affected from investor risk appetite 
and expected uncertainty in the German stock markets. The VAR analysis finds that there 
are causal relationship between yield spread and risk aversion, i.e. increase in risk aversion 
leads to higher yield spread. The magnitude of this effect is clearly higher compared to the 
OLS estimates.  
 Last it is studied whether the sentiment model that contains information on risk 
aversion and uncertainty provides better forecasts for yield spreads compared to simple 
AR(1) model. According to the results the sentiment model provides better predictions for 
the next day´s yield spreads only during the turbulent times. With monthly data frequency 
the sentiment model outperforms the AR(1) model also during the pre-crisis periods. The 
forecasting evaluations suggest that risk aversion and uncertainty have significant long run 
predictive power on spreads whereas in short run these measures do not provide valuable 
information for the forecasts. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: the next reviews existing literature 
on the relationship between investor sentiment and asset prices and provides theoretical 
framework for the empirical analysis. Section 3 introduces the dataset and presents the 
decomposition method which results the measures for risk aversion and uncertainty from the 
VDAX index. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy and results from regression- and 
VAR-analyzes and forecasting evaluations. Also internal and external validity and 
limitations of the study are shortly discussed. The last section provides a conclusion and 
suggestions for future research. 
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2 Theoretical motivation and literature review 
This section reviews existing literature on the relationship between investor sentiment and 
asset prices. I present a simple consumption based asset pricing model that provides a 
framework for the empirical analysis on yield spreads in European sovereign debt markets. 
This model suggests that when the fundamental based risk premium between two risky assets 
is time-invariant, changes in observed spreads are determined by investor risk aversion and 
economic uncertainty. In addition, this section discusses about behavioral finance theories 
that deal with short-selling constraints and investor disagreement. These theories provide an 
alternative viewpoint for the relationship between investor sentiment and asset prices. 
 The link between asset valuation and investor sentiment is the subject of considerable 
debate in the finance literature (Brown & Cliff 2005). According to the traditional asset 
pricing theories, competition among rational investors leads to an equilibrium in which asset 
prices equal the rationally discounted value of expected future cash flows. These theories 
argue that the demands of irrational investors are offset by arbitrageurs and thus irrational 
behavior should not significantly affect prices (Baker & Wurgler 2006).  
 On the other hand, as early as 1936 John Maynard Keynes argued that investors’ 
animal spirits can move prices in a way unrelated to fundamentals and cause wild 
fluctuations in the financial markets. More recently, Baker and Wurgler (2007) define 
investor sentiment as a belief about future cash flows or investment risks that is not justified 
by the facts at hand.  
 During the last decades behavioral finance literature has examined this phenomena 
by assuming that financial markets can be understood by using models in which some agents 
are not fully rational. This branch of literature has two building blocks: limits to arbitrage 
and psychology (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Typically this literature suggests that sentiment 
affects the expectations on future cash flows and risks and thus has an effect on investment 
decisions and stock returns. Positive sentiment (also referred as excessive optimism or 
animal spirits) enforces investors´ confidence on their abilities to evaluate investment 
opportunities and makes them more willing to take risks. Brown and Cliff (2005) argue that 
sentiment is fairly persistent phenomena; people become more optimistic as they are 
reinforced by others joining on the bandwagon.  
 The behavior of financial asset prices in relation to consumption has been widely 
examined in the field of theoretical macroeconomics. This approach provides a cornerstone 
for the modern consumption based asset pricing theory. It assumes that investors are rational 
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in a sense that they maximize their expected utility given the utility function and budget 
constraint. I present this theory with a simple textbook framework.  
 Consider a complete market economy as in Lucas (1978) where representative 
investor makes portfolio choices over one risk-free and one risky assets, 𝐴𝑡  and 𝑆𝑡 
respectively. By using the arbitrage condition, I illustrate how the difference between rates 
of returns of these assets, the equity premium, can be computed.  
 Representative investor chooses consumption stream {𝐶𝑡+𝑖}𝑖=0
∞  in order to: 
   
  max 𝐸𝑡  ∑ 𝛽
𝑖𝑈(𝐶𝑡+𝑖), 𝛽 ∈ (0,1)
∞
𝑖=0         (1) 
  s.t 
  𝑆𝑡+1 + 𝐴𝑡+1 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑠𝑆𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡
𝑎𝐴𝑡 + 𝑊𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 
   lim
𝑖→∞
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠 𝑆𝑡+𝑗
∏𝑗=1
𝑖 𝑅𝑡+𝑗
𝑠 = 0 
  lim
𝑖→∞
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 𝐴𝑡+𝑗
∏𝑗=1
𝑖 𝑅𝑡+𝑗
𝑎 = 0 
 
It is assumed that returns from risk-free and risky assets, 𝑅𝑡
𝑎  and 𝑅𝑡
𝑠 , follow first order 
Markov process that is exogenous to the investor. Moreover, the risk-free return 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 is 
known already in period t. 𝑊𝑡 represents wage (or other) incomes that investor receives at 
time t and β is the subjective discount factor. The Bellman equation for this maximization 
problem can be written as: 
 
𝑉(𝑅𝑡
𝑠𝑆𝑡, 𝑅𝑡
𝑎𝐴𝑡) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑡+1,𝐴𝑡+1{𝑈(𝑅𝑡
𝑠𝑆𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡
𝑎𝐴𝑡 + 𝑊𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡+1 − 𝐴𝑡+1) +
𝛽𝑉(𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠 𝑆𝑡+1, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 𝐴𝑡+1)}         (2) 
 
And the first order conditions are: 
 
𝐴𝑡+1 : 𝑈
′(𝐶𝑡) = 𝛽𝐸𝑡{𝑉𝐴
′{𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠 𝑆𝑡+1, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 𝐴𝑡+1}}       (3) 
𝑆𝑡+1 : 𝑈
′(𝐶𝑡) = 𝛽𝐸𝑡{𝑉𝑆
′{𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠 𝑆𝑡+1, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 𝐴𝑡+1}}       (4) 
 
By differentiating the Bellman equation with respect to 𝐴𝑡 and 𝑆𝑡, using envelope conditions 
for 𝑉𝐴 and 𝑉𝑆, shifting one period forward, taking expectations and plugging back into first 
order conditions, we end to the well-known consumption beta-theory (see e.g. Campbell, 
2003) : 
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    𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 𝐸𝑡 {
𝛽𝑈′(𝐶𝑡+1)
𝑈′(𝐶𝑡)
} = 1    (5) 
    𝛽𝐸𝑡 {𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠 𝑈
′(𝐶𝑡+1)
𝑈′(𝐶𝑡)
} = 1    (6) 
 
By equating (5) and (6), the equity premium can be expressed as: 
 
   
𝐸𝑡{𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠 }−𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣{𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠 ,
𝛽𝑈′(𝐶𝑡+1)
𝑈′(𝐶𝑡)
}    (7) 
 
Equation 7 shows that if the investor is risk-averse, the risky asset must offer premium over 
the risk-free asset. The premium is proportional to the covariance of its return with respect 
to the marginal rate of transformation of consumption from today to tomorrow. Moreover, 
for equity premium to be positive, it must be that consumption itself is positively correlated 
with returns from risky asset (since 𝑈′(𝐶) < 0 ). Higher the covariance between 
consumption and returns of risky asset, higher the premium should be in order for investor 
to hold risky asset.      
 By assuming CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility function (𝑈′(𝐶) = 𝐶−𝛾, 
where γ is a coefficient for risk aversion) and denoting 
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐶𝑡
= ∆𝐶𝑡+1, second order Taylor 
approximation for (7) yields following expression for the equity premium: 
 
log 𝐸𝑡{𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠 } − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1
𝑎 = 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1) ≈
𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠 , 𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1)𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1      (8)  
 
Where 𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 denotes the variation of the return from the risky asset and 
𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1represents the variation in consumption growth (i.e. economic uncertainty).  
According to the equation 8, if the performance of the risky asset is positively correlated 
with consumption growth (i.e. macroeconomic development or state of the economy), the 
equity premium is positive. The higher the risk aversion, the more sensitive the equity 
premium is to the co-movements of risky returns and consumption growth. In addition, the 
uncertainty on consumption growth and returns increase the required premium.  
 In order to motivate the empirical analysis of this thesis, I will extent this setup by 
assuming that there exists two risky assets in the economy, 𝑆1 and 𝑆2. The spread between 
two risky assets can be expressed as: 
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log 𝐸𝑡{𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠1 } − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑡{𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠2 } 
≈ 𝛾𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠1 , 𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1)𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1𝑠1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠2 , 𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1)𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1𝑠2 ) (9) 
 
Equation 9 shows that the spread between two risky assets depends on differences in asset 
specific fundamental factors, namely the correlations between pay-offs and consumption 
growth (i.e. the risk that arises from the macroeconomic sensitivity of the asset´s returns) 
and the deviations in asset returns. The more asset 1´s return is correlated with consumption 
growth and the higher is the uncertainty on of its return compared to asset 2, the higher is 
the spread between assets. In addition, investor´s risk aversion and the level of uncertainty 
on consumption (economic) growth enforce this fundamental-based premium.  
 This simple framework leads to very intuitive prediction; if the representative 
investor in highly risk-averse and there is high uncertainty on consumption growth, the 
required premium for safer asset is lower to riskier, compared to the case with low risk 
aversion and low economic uncertainty. 
 In this framework, risk aversion can be associated to the phenomena that behavioral 
economists call for investor sentiment. However, presented type of consumption based 
models typically assume that risk aversion is a constant parameter, which suggests that 
investor sentiment does not cause time variation to the asset prices. Due to empirically 
observed equity premium- and volatility-puzzles, Campbell (2003) suggests that a more 
realistic model for asset markets should contain high market price of risk that is time-varying 
and correlated with the state of the economy. In line with this view, recent structural dynamic 
asset pricing models have identified time-varying risk aversion and economic uncertainty as 
potential drivers of asset price dynamics (see e.g. Campbell and Cochrane 1999, Bansal and 
Yaron 2004 and Bekaert, Engstrom and Xing 2009).  
 For example Campbell and Cochrane (1999) present a model were the utility of a 
representative agent is a power function of the difference between consumption and so called 
habit term that is a slow-moving nonlinear average of past aggregate consumption. In this 
framework the agent becomes more risk-averse in bad times than in good times, because the 
consumption is lower relative to its past history. According to their model the equity 
premium can be explained with high average level of risk aversion and high stock market 
volatility. 
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 Motivated by the above mentioned asset pricing models, the subsequent empirical 
analysis in section 4 is based on the reduced form version of the model (9) where investor´s 
risk-aversion 𝛾   is allowed to be time-varying 𝛾𝑡 . Moreover, it is assumed that the 
fundamental part of the risk premium between some AAA-rated Eurozone-country (i) and 
Germany (G) is time-invariant constant 𝑟𝑖:  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠𝑖 , 𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1)𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1𝑠1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠𝐺 , 𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1)𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑡+1𝑠𝐺 = 𝑟𝑖  (10) 
  
 If this identification assumption holds, the yield spread for a country i at time t is an 
increasing function of constant country specific fundamental risk (𝑟𝑖), risk aversion (𝛾𝑡) and 
economic uncertainty (𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1) : 
 
  𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹(𝑟𝑖, 𝛾𝑡, 𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1)    (11) 
 
Although the behavioral and structural (or rational) theories examine financial markets from 
different viewpoints, it can be seen that the new developments in the consumption based 
asset pricing models have converged the predictions of these literatures. Both model families 
recognize that changes in investor sentiment (or risk aversion) might affect asset prices.      
 The stock returns predictability in the cross-section is well established by the 
empirical literature. According to Campbell (2000) some firm characteristics, such as the 
book-to-market equity ratio, have predictive power on future returns. What causes this 
predictability continues to be debated in the literature. For example, Nagel (2005) suggests 
that the predictability might arise from the variation in rational expected returns across firms. 
An alternative explanation could be mispricing which results overpriced firms to generate 
lower returns than what have been expected whereas the returns of underpriced firms are 
higher. Overall, the observed predictability has been one of the key drivers for the 
developments of the both structural and behavioral asset pricing theories during the last 
decades. 
 From the rational viewpoint the main weakness of mispricing stories is that why 
these abnormal returns are not arbitraged away. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) highlight the 
role of limits to arbitrage for mispricing to persist in the presence of sophisticated 
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professional investors. Short-sales1 constraints are often considered as one of the main limit 
to arbitrage in the behavioral finance literature (these constraints might arise for example 
from some institutional and psychological reasons, short selling can be costly or restricted 
by the authorities). 
 According to Miller (1977) stocks can become overpriced if some investors are too 
optimistic and short-sell constraints are binding. The assumption of binding short-sell 
constraints and investor disagreement are the core building blocks for various theories of 
bubbles in behavioral finance literature. For example, Miller (1977) and Chen, Hong and 
Stein (2002) show that disagreement combined with binding short-sales constraints lead to 
over-pricing as pessimists sit out of the market. Alternatively Harrison and Kreps (1978) and 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) consider that due to short-sell constraints investors might 
value the re-sell potential to other investor who might have higher valuation. This kind of 
frameworks generate a bubble or overpricing in which price exceeds the fundamental value. 
Empirical studies suggests that constraints on short-selling can lead to an optimism-bias in 
prices (see e.g. Chen et al., 2002; Jones and Lamont, 2002; Lamont, 2004; Reed, 2003). 
 Theoretical literature provides alternative mechanisms for the relationship between 
investor sentiment and asset prices. The behavioral branch of theories suggest that investors 
may form flawed beliefs and therefore incorrectly evaluate assets which causes deviations 
from the intrinsic values (see, e.g., De Long et al., 1990 and Kumar and Lee, 2006). If the 
mispricing gets corrected when sentiment wanes (or the economic fundamentals are 
revealed), this literature predicts that there is negative relationship between market sentiment 
and future asset returns. Qualitatively, consumption based asset pricing models with time-
varying risk aversion also result similar relationship.  
 However, Brown and Cliff (2005) point out that the existence of systematic 
mispricing is hard to reveal because of the difficulty in examining the issue empirically. 
Unfortunately, there is not clear consensus on how the fundamental value of an asset should 
be measured. For this reason a researcher has a joint test for mispricing and model of 
discount rates which makes the identification of mispricing difficult (Barberis and Thaler, 
2003).  Correspondingly, the definition and proper measurement of investor sentiment are 
somewhat ambiguous and debated.  
                                                                
1 Short-selling is a transaction where investor profits if the price of a stock decreases.  Short 
seller borrows the stock and sell it expecting that the price is lower when the stock needs to 
be repurchased and returned to the lender.  
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 The questions of whether the sentiment affects asset prices has been examined with 
various empirical strategies. Several studies that rely on the market level analysis find that 
investor sentiment has significant effect on stock returns in general (see e.g. Brown and Cliff 
2004, Brown and Cliff 2005, Baker and Wurgler, 2006, Baker and Wurgler, 2007, 
Schmeling, 2009 and Baker et al., 2012). Another branch of behavioral studies show that the 
assumption of rational evaluation in asset pricing does not always hold by identifying 
individual cases which violates the law of one price (see e.g. Lamont and Thaler, 2003 
(3Com’s spinoff of Palm) and Froot and Dabora, 1999 (twin-companies)).   
 Traditionally researchers have relied survey-based indices for investor sentiment or 
market-based measures such as option implied volatilities, mutual fund flows and trading 
and IPO volumes. Recently, Da, Engelberg and Gao (2014) utilize daily internet search 
volume from millions of households to reveal market-level sentiment. They find that the 
search-based sentiment measure predicts short-term return reversals, temporary increases in 
volatility and mutual fund flows out of equity funds and into bond funds. In addition, studies 
that examine non-economic events find that sentiment-changing events cause changes in 
asset prices (see e.g. weather conditions; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003, sports; Edmans, 
Garcia, and Norli, 2007, seasonal affective disorder; Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi, 2003, 
aviation disasters; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010) 
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3 Measures for risk aversion and uncertainty 
Consumption based asset pricing model in section 2 suggests that yield spread between two 
risky assets depends positively on difference in fundamental risk, the level of  investor risk 
aversion and economic uncertainty. This section provides measures for the two latter 
determinants which are utilized in empirical analysis for sovereign yield spreads in section 
4. Also data for empirical analyses is introduced. 
3.1 Data 
The dataset is unbalanced panel containing daily 10-year government bond yield spreads to 
Germany for the Eurozone countries which hold AAA-rating from Standard & Poors rating 
agency. These countries are namely Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Spain. The sample period starts at 01/03/2002 and ends at 10/10/2014, when the last country 
(Finland) lost its triple-A rating. A down-graded country is excluded from the sample day 
before the official announcement, giving 14053 observations. Data for 10-year government 
bond yields has been collected from Macrobond.  
 Measures for risk aversion and uncertainty are calculated by using daily values of 
VDAX index and daily realized variances (calculated from 5-minute intra-day returns) for 
DAX index. The data for VDAX and realized daily variance are collected from Macrobond 
and Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance Realized Library (Gerd et. al, 2009), 
respectively. Data for CDS prices has been collected from Macrobond. 
3.2 Method 
Behavioral finance literature and financial institutions have provided a variety of indicators 
for risk aversion and market sentiment (Coudert and Gex, 2008). This study utilizes fairly 
recent and novel measure for investor risk aversion, the equity variance premium. In this 
study, variance premium in German stock market is defined as a difference between the 
squared VDAX index and an estimate of the conditional variance of the stock market, the 
DAX index.  
 The VDAX index is the risk-neutral expected stock market variance for the DAX 
contract and is computed from a panel of options prices. The American equivalent, VIX for 
S&P500 index, has been considered as a fear index for asset markets (Whaley, 2000). These 
volatility indices reflect physical expected volatility (stock market uncertainty) and variance 
risk premium. The variance premium is based on the objective financial market information 
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and purifies option-implied volatility from the effect of uncertainty and physical volatility. 
For this reason the variance premium leaves a measure that is correlated with risk aversion 
(Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca, 2013). 
 Bollerslev, Tauchen and Zhou (2009) provide evidence on predictive power of the 
variance premium on stock returns. Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) find strong 
interactions between monetary policy and the variance premium which suggests that 
monetary policy may actually affect risk aversion in the market place. Subsequently, Bekaert 
and Hoerova (2014) find that the variance premium predicts stock returns whereas the 
conditional stock market variance predicts economic activity. Moreover, they find that the 
conditional variance has relatively higher predictive power for financial instability than does 
the variance premium.   
 In order to decompose the VDAX index into risk aversion and uncertainty measures, 
this study utilizes the approach developed by seminal paper of Bekaert and Hoerova, and Lo 
Duca (2013) for VIX index. The variance risk premium (VP) for German stock market is 
defined as: 
 
  𝑉𝑃𝑡 = 𝑉𝐷𝐴𝑋𝑡
2 − 𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑉𝑡+1
(22)
]      (12) 
 
Here the VDAX is the implied option volatility of the DAX index for contracts with a 
maturity of one month, and 𝑅𝑉𝑡+1
(22)
 is the DAX realized variance measured over the next 
month (22 trading days) using 5 minute returns. Here the time index t denotes daily 
observations.   
 The squared VDAX can be interpreted as conditional return variance that uses risk-
neutral probability measure, whereas the conditional variance is based on the actual physical 
probability measure. Theoretically the risk-adjusted measure shifts probability mass is 
shifted to states with higher marginal utility (bad states) and this implies that the variance 
premium will be increasing in the economy’s risk aversion (Bekaert and Hoerova, 2014) 
 In the first phase of the decomposition the expected future realized variance needs to 
be estimated. Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) obtained the estimates by projecting 
future realized monthly variances (computed using squared 5-minute returns) onto the 
squared VIX, the dividend yield and the real three-month T-bill rate. They conducted a 
horserace between eight volatility forecasting models and ended up to following model for 
S&P500 index´s future realized variance: 
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  𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−22
2 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡−1
(22)
+ 𝜀𝑡   (13) 
  
The fitted value from the two-variable projection was their estimated conditional variance 
and their measure of “uncertainty.” The difference between the squared VIX and the 
conditional variance they defined as a measure of “risk aversion”, corresponding to VP in 
(12).  Bekaert and Hoerova (2014) examined alternative specifications and suggested 
following forecasting model which adds the lagged weekly and daily variances to model 11:   
 
𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−22
2 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡−1
(22)
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡−22
(5)
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡−22
(1)
+ 𝜀𝑡  (14) 
 
In order to obtain 𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑉𝑡+1
(22)
] for DAX index, I estimate the models 11 and 12 for German 
stock markets by using daily variances from 5-minute intra-day data. Based on the in- and 
out-off-sample forecasting abilities, the model 12 is selected for VDAX decomposition. The 
correlation coefficient (adjusted R-squared) between actual and forecasted variances is about 
0.61 during the period 2002 to 2014. Figure 1 illustrates the developments in realized and 
forecasted variances (RVAR and RVARF, respectively) and the forecasting model seems to 
perform fairly well during the sample period. 
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Figure 1. Actual (RVAR) and forecasted (RVARF) variance for German stock market. 
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3.3 Validating the measures 
In this section I provide descriptive evidence for risk aversion and uncertainty measures and 
examine how these are related to some alternative measures and flight-to-quality and flight-
to-liquidity phenomena. 
 Figure 2 shows the developments in risk aversion and uncertainty measures obtained 
from (10). The measure for uncertainty (RVARF) increases significantly during U.S 
corporate scandals and war of Iraq (2002 and 2003), after Lehman (autumn 2008) and during 
the different phases of European sovereign debt crisis (early 2010´s). The risk aversion 
measure (VP) follows fairly similar pattern. However, it seems that the peaks in risk aversion 
leads to some extent the corresponding peaks in uncertainty. In daily frequency, the 
correlation between the measures is low, only 0.04. Although the measures seem to have 
positive long run relationship, in short run the measures are almost orthogonal. VDAX index 
itself is more correlated with uncertainty than risk aversion, the correlations being 0.8 and 
0.6, respectively. 
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Figure 2. Risk aversion (VP) and uncertainty (RVARF) measures for German stock market. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the developments in RVARF and Economic Sentiment Index for the 
Eurozone (monthly frequency). The Economic Sentiment index is a composite indicator 
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published by European Commission. It is made up of five sectoral confidence indicators 
with different weights: Industrial confidence indicator, Services confidence indicator, 
Consumer confidence indicator, Construction confidence indicator and Retail trade 
confidence indicator. Stock market uncertainty and Economic sentiment index seem to be 
negatively correlated. During the high stock market uncertainty in Germany the Eurozone 
aggregate real economic sentiment is low. This is in line with the well-known observation 
that stock market volatility is high during the economic downturn (see e.g. Bloom 2009). 
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Figure 3. Economic Sentiment index for the Eurozone (Esindex, right scale) and uncertainty for German stock 
market (RVARF, left scale). 
 
Figure 4 shows that the estimated variance premium for German stock market co-moves 
with European Central Bank´s (ECB) measure for global risk aversion indicator. However, 
the global risk aversion indicator is clearly more volatile. The indicator is constructed as the 
first principal component of five risk aversion indicators, namely Commerzbank Global Risk 
Perception, UBS FX Risk Index, Westpac’s Risk Appetite Index, BoA ML Risk Aversion 
Indicator and Credit Suisse Risk Appetite Index. A rise in the indicator denotes an increase 
in risk aversion. 
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Figure 4. Risk aversion (VP, left scale) and European Central Banks measure for global risk aversion 
(ECBrisk, right scale). 
 
It can be concluded that the estimated measures for variance premium (risk-aversion) and 
conditional variance (uncertainty) seems plausible. The forecasting model for realized 
variance performs fairly well and the measures have intuitive developments during the crises 
periods. Moreover, descriptive evidence suggests that VP and RVARF are correlated with 
alternative measures.  
 Next I examine the relationships between risk aversion and uncertainty measures to 
the phenomena which the literature has often connected to the investor sentiment, namely 
flight-to-liquidity and flight-to-quality. According to Baele et al (2013), a flight-to-liquidity 
arises when risk averse investment managers fear redemptions during high volatility periods. 
Then an increase in volatility may increase the demand for assets with high liquidity. 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) show that knightian uncertainty may lead investors to 
shed risky assets in favor of safe assets when aggregate liquidity is low. Increase in risk 
aversion leads to higher risk premiums, which in turn drives down the prices of risky assets 
(flight-to-quality). 
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Figure 5. Uncertainty (RVARF, left scale) and difference between European small and large cap total return 
indices (Sldif, right scale, 02/01/2002=0). 
The difference between small and large cap total return indices illustrates the flight-to-
liquidity tendency in European stock markets. Figure 5 shows that during the high 
uncertainty periods, the relative returns from small and less liquid stocks decrease. This 
suggests that volatility increases demand for liquid stocks which increases prices and returns 
from these assets. Figure 8 illustrates similar relationship between risk aversion and flight-
to-liquidity tendency. 
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Figure 6. Risk aversion (VP, left scale) and difference between European small and large cap total return 
indices (Sldif, right scale, 02/01/2002=0). 
 
Figures 7 and 8 suggest that uncertainty and risk aversion are positively related to the flight-
to-safety tendency. Difference between total returns in BBB- and AAA-rated European 
corporate bond indices illustrates the investors’ willingness to hold risky assets. Due to fact 
that the bonds are issued by relatively large companies, the measure probably lacks the 
flight-to-liquidity effect. During the high risk aversion and uncertainty periods investors shift 
their demand from riskier to safer bonds. After the latest financial crisis there is persistent 
shift in the difference. However, the negative correlation between series seems to hold 
during the post-crisis period.  
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Figure 7. Uncertainty (RVARF, left scale) and difference between European BBB- and AAA-rated corporate 
bond total return indices (BBB-AAA, right scale, 02/01/2002=0). 
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Figure 8. Risk aversion (VP, left scale) and difference between European BBB- and AAA-rated corporate bond 
total return indices (BBB-AAA, right scale, 02/01/2002=0). 
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Table 1: OLS-estimates for risk-aversion and uncertainty on flight-to-liquidity (Sldif) and flight-to-quality 
(BBB-AAA) measures (sample 2002-2014, 3320 observations, robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis, bolded values are statistically significant at 5 percent level) 
 
 
The regression analysis supports previous descriptive evidence for the relationships between 
the measures and flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity phenomena. Regression 1 and 2 in 
table 1 estimate the effect of risk-aversion and uncertainty on difference between small and 
large cap indices. Both high risk-aversion and uncertainty measures are statistically 
significantly related to the flight-to-liquidity tendency. Regressions 3 and 4 suggest that 
similar conclusion applies also for the flight-to-quality (difference between returns in BBB 
and AAA-rated corporate bonds). However, in regression 4 the change in flight-to-quality 
tendency is enforced only by the risk aversion, the coefficient for uncertainty being 
statistically insignificant. 
 Regressions 1 and 3 show that compared to risk aversion, uncertainty is more related 
to the levels of both phenomena. However, regressions 2 and 4 that estimate the change in 
flight-to-liquidity and flight-to-quality tendencies suggest that risk aversion is more 
important determinant. This suggest that risk-appetite might be more important driver for 
the shifts in investor preferences in terms of liquidity and safety of the assets. However, the 
overall evaluation of the relative importance of the measures on the phenomena is somewhat 
ambiguous.     
 This section concludes that, in terms of alternative measures and observed shifts in 
investor preferences, both VP and RVARF react to the changes in investor sentiment and 
expected uncertainty in the European financial markets. Next section studies whether these 
measures can explain sovereign yield spreads in triple-A-rated Eurozone countries. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0,630902 0,001990 0,179292 0,000574
(0,013927) (0,000477) (0,009038) (0,000154)
VP -0,001777 -0,000019 -0,000741 -0,000015
(0,000247) (0,00000561) (0,000117) (0,00000304)
RVARF -0,003268 -0,000009 -0,001498 -0,000003
(0,000302) (0,00000414) (0,000124) (0,00000449)
AR(1) 0,997677 0,998533
(0,000776) (0,000588)
Adj. R-squared 0,363 0,999 0,216 0,999
Flight-to-liquidity Flight-to-quality
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4 Estimating the effect of investor sentiment on 
sovereign yield spreads  
The vast majority of previous empirical studies on investor sentiment and asset prices is 
based on the evidence from US stock markets (Schmeling 2009). This master thesis 
contributes to the existing literature by studying the effects of sentiment phenomena in the 
asset class that is often considered as a safe haven in the European financial markets; the 
triple-A-rated long maturity government bonds. Some authors (see e.g. De Grauwe and Ji, 
2013) consider that during the Euro crisis, many sovereign borrowers in the Eurozone have 
paid significant risk premiums that cannot be justified by fiscal or macroeconomic 
fundamentals. This section examines whether these premiums are related to the levels of 
aversion and uncertainty in the Eurozone financial markets.  
 Empirical studies that examine whether some asset is mispriced to its fundamentals 
due to investor sentiment face significant challenges. For example, in a panel framework all 
relevant cross-section specific fundamental factors need to be controlled. In practice, it is 
hard to estimate plausible counterfactual scenario that answers to the question; what would 
have been the price of some asset if the sentiment in the market place would have been 
different? In addition the definition and measurement for sentiment are probably always 
somewhat questionable. For example, interpretation of the coefficient of simple volatility 
index is ambiguous since, in theory, it contains information on both risk aversion and stock 
market uncertainty. 
 By keeping these issues in mind, the analysis in this section aims to control the effects 
of time-varying fundamentals by focusing on yield spreads to Germany in other triple-A-
rated Eurozone countries. Intuitively this empirical design is related to Froot`s and Dabora`s 
(1999) study on mispricing between twin-companies. Compared to other studies on 
sovereign yield spreads (see e.g. Schuknecht et al., 2010 and  De Grauwe and Ji, 2013), this 
design does not require the inclusion of macroeconomic or fiscal variables and it allows to 
conduct the analysis with higher data frequency. In addition, this analysis utilizes VDAX-
decomposition (from the previous section) that enables to separate the impacts of risk 
aversion and uncertainty on yield spreads.  
 The empirical analysis is threefold. First, regression analysis studies whether the 
yield spreads to Germany are related to the estimated risk aversion and uncertainty measures. 
Second, the sign of the causality is examined in VAR framework. Last the forecasting ability 
of the measures on yield spreads is studied. 
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4.1 Identification and empirical strategy 
This study is conducted with 10-year government bonds issued by Eurozone countries which 
hold triple A-rating from Standard & Poors rating agency. According to Standard & Poors, 
an obligor rated AAA (highest issuer credit rating assigned by S&P Global Ratings) has 
extremely strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. The five key factors that form 
the foundation of their sovereign credit analysis are institutional effectiveness and political 
risks, economic structure and growth prospects, external liquidity and international 
investment position, fiscal performance and flexibility (as well as debt burden) and monetary 
flexibility (Standard & Poors, 2011).  
 The rationale for the identification strategy stems to the fact that investment grade 
sovereign bonds have been considered as the safest assets in the world. The lack of defaults 
among developed country governments underpinned the widely used assumption that 
government bonds provide a good proxy for the long-horizon risk-free rate (Fontana and 
Scheicher, 2016).  It could be expected the difference in default risk between Germany and 
triple-A-tranche Euro-sovereigns should not be much affected by fiscal or macroeconomic 
developments. If the investor holds the bond to the maturity, the expected nominal return 
from the investment is likely to be certain. From the historical perspective it is extremely 
unlikely, although possible, event that a country with triple-A-rating ends up to default 
during the next 10 year period.  
 Eurozone countries in general, are fairly similar with respect to economic 
fundamentals; countries locate in the same geographical area, share similar economic and 
institutional structures and the economies are highly inter-connected. Due to single currency, 
countries have common monetary policy and hence, the yield spreads do not contain 
exchange rate risk. Moreover, the sovereign risk premiums converged rapidly after the 
introduction of the single currency, which could be interpreted as some kind of expected 
joint liability of government debts in the union.  
 The empirical evidence on the role of fiscal and economic fundamentals determining 
the realized sovereign bond spreads is mixed. Some papers attribute the importance of 
sovereign's fiscal position for risk premiums (e.g., Codogno et al., 2003; Schuknecht et al., 
2010; Aizenman et al., 2013). In contrast, authors such as Favero et al. (2010) and 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) consider that bond yield spreads are significantly affected 
by international factors that reflect global investor risk aversion.  Blommestein et al. (2012) 
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and De Grauwe and Ji (2013) argue that during the European sovereign debt crisis the 
increased risk premiums are mostly driven by market sentiment. 
 The main difference between German and other triple-A Eurozone government 
bonds is that the German bonds are considered as the benchmark in the Eurozone. Like US 
Treasuries, the Swiss franc, the Japanese Yen and gold, German Bund have had a safe haven 
status in the global financial markets (Santis, 2012) Generally the yield spreads to Germany 
have been positive. This has been the case since German bonds are the most liquid ones and 
investor pays smaller transaction and information costs when buying German bonds 
compared to other Euro sovereigns. It is plausible to expect that the fundamental based yield 
spread to Germany is positive although fairly time-invariant. Due to fact that debt claim´s 
up-side payoffs are capped at some constant, the payoff pattern is concave in the investor 
beliefs about fundamentals (Hong and Sraer, 2013). 
 
Figure 9. Expected payoffs from high and low credit quality bonds with respect to expected economic 
fundamentals. 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the differences between high and low risk debt claims´ payoff patterns 
with respect to expected state of the economy. Due to concave payoff pattern, the value of 
the safe asset is less affected by the fundamentals compared to the riskier one. It can be 
assumed that the Eurozone countries holding the best credit rating have fairly similar payoff 
patterns to fundamentals. Moreover, if it is assumed that AAA-countries won´t default under 
any circumstances, then the payoff patterns are vertical to economic fundamentals.  
 Recall that the consumption based asset pricing model in section 2 suggests that yield 
spread between two risky assets depends positively on difference in fundamental risk, the 
level of investor risk aversion and economic uncertainty (equation 9). Therefore, the 
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empirical analysis requires two identification assumptions. First, the fundamental based risk 
premiums to Germany should be constant (equation 10). Second, the estimated measures for 
risk aversion and uncertainty, 𝑉𝑃𝑡  and 𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐹𝑡  respectively, should correspond their 
theoretical counterparts 𝛾𝑡 and 𝜎𝑙𝑜𝑔∆𝐶𝑡+1.     
 If these assumptions hold, the yield spread for country i at time t is an increasing 
function of constant country specific fundamental risk, variance premium and conditional 
variance: 
 
  𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹(𝑟𝑖, 𝑉𝑃𝑡, 𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐹𝑡)    (15) 
 
This section studies whether these measures have explanatory power on observed yield 
spreads as the theoretical motivation suggests. The estimated baseline model is: 
 
  𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (16) 
 
Where 𝛼 is constant and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
 Although the empirical analysis is based on consumption based asset pricing model, 
it should acknowledged that also behavioral theories can lead to the corresponding 
conclusions for the role of risk aversion.  In the presence of binding short-sales constraints 
country i`s bond can get over-priced as pessimists sit out of the market, which leads smaller 
spread to Germany when risk aversion is low. Alternatively, during the time of decreasing 
risk aversion investors might value the potential to re-sell at a higher price to someone with 
a higher valuation due to binding short-sales constraints which also decreases the spread. 
According to both arguments, high sentiment combined with investor disagreement and 
short-selling constraints, can generate a bubble or overpricing in which the yield of country 
i´s bond is below its fundamental value 𝑟𝑖.  
 Previous studies suggest that there are significant limits to arbitrage in European 
sovereign debt markets, which makes the above mentioned behavioral mechanism plausible. 
For example, Fontana and Scheicher (2016) observe a relationship between the derivatives 
market and the underlying cash market characterized by sizable deviations from the no-
arbitrage relationship. They show that short-selling frictions explain the persistence of 
positive basis deviations. Duffie (2010) reports that even during the latest financial crisis, 
the short positions were not common in the Eurozone´s sovereign debt markets. For example 
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the ratio of net CDS positions to Finnish government debt was under three percent. However, 
the speculation with naked CDSs and short bond positions were associated to the turbulence 
in the European bond market. In 2010, Germany prohibited naked CDSs of euro-
denominated sovereign bonds and naked short sales2 based on those bonds. The regulation 
aimed to drive down the rising bond yields and suppress the volatility in the market (Pu and 
Zhang 2012).  
 As a robustness check, it is studied whether the baseline results hold when the 
assumption of constant fundamental based risk premium is relaxed. This is done by 
controlling differences in CDS prices relative to Germany.  A CDS contract protects investor 
against the default of the issuing sovereign. The premium which the protection buyer pays 
to the protection seller is determined in CDS market and reflects the expected default risk of 
the respective country (see e.g. Aizenman et al., 2013).  Fontana and Scheicher (2016) find 
that CDSs correlate with country-specific economic covariates. In this sense, differences in 
CDS prices between Germany and other triple-A Eurozone countries provide a market based 
proxy for differences in expected default risk (i.e. in fiscal and macroeconomic 
fundamentals). Compared to actual fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals, the main 
benefit of CDS data is that it available in a daily frequency. Unfortunately, when CDS prices 
are controlled, the number of observations decreases. This is due to fact that the CDS prices 
are available for the majority of analyzed sovereigns from 2006 or 2007 onwards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
2 Naked short selling is a case of short selling without first arranging a borrow. 
Estimating the effect of investor sentiment on 
sovereign yield spreads 
26  
 
 
4.2 Descriptive evidence 
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Figure 10. Average yield spread to Germany in AAA-rated Eurozone countries (right scale) and risk aversion 
(left scale). 
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Figure 11. Average yield spreads to Germany in AAA-rated Eurozone countries (right scale) and uncertainty 
(left scale). 
 
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the developments in average yield spread and risk aversion and 
uncertainty measures. During the period 2002 to 2007 sovereign risk was almost equally 
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priced in the Eurozone, the yields spreads to Germany being near zero. In early 2008 the 
spreads increased rapidly breaching the 1 percent (100 basis point) level in May 2009 and 
November 2011. The low levels in spreads coincide with low levels in risk aversion and 
uncertainty measures. In addition, peaks in risk aversion seem to lead peaks in spread 
whereas the developments in spreads and uncertainty are more coincident. 
   
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, yield spread to Germany, risk aversion and uncertainty, whole sample 
 
 
Table 3: Average spreads to Germany, correlations between spreads, risk aversion and uncertainty, period 
when a country is included to the sample 
 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the average yield spread has been about 18 basis points (0,18 percent) 
and the spreads have been varied between 7 and 280 basis points. Moreover, table 3 reports 
that the average spreads have been fairly similar in individual countries, which suggests that 
the country specific heterogeneity in economic fundamentals does not lead to significantly 
different sovereign risk premium in the triple A-tranche. For example in 2005 government 
debt-to-GDP-ratios varied from 32 (Ireland) to 82 (France) percent. This finding supports 
the identification assumption of concave pay-off-pattern.  
 One might consider the magnitudes of the yield spreads as economically insignificant 
at the first sight. However, taking into account the fact that the average yield in German 10-
Spread VP RVARF
 Mean 0,18 16,45 36,18
 Median 0,07 9,21 21,22
 Maximum 2,82 406,23 387,72
 Minimum -0,20 -221,29 5,88
 Std. Dev. 0,27 33,29 40,40
Country Spread VP RVARF
Austria 0,25 0,09 0,28 1.3.2002 12.1.2012
Finland 0,18 0,14 0,30 1.3.2002 9.10.2014
France 0,17 0,05 0,20 1.3.2002 12.1.2012
Ireland 0,15 0,20 0,37 1.3.2002 27.3.2009
Netherlands 0,13 0,11 0,28 1.3.2002 12.1.2012
Spain 0,11 0,26 0,72 12.3.2004 9.1.2009
Average 0,17 0,14 0,36
Time period
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year government bonds has been about 320 basis points during the sample period, the 
spreads (in relative terms) have been significant  from the sovereign borrowing viewpoint.    
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Figure 12. Spreads in individual AAA-rated countries. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the data is unbalanced panel. Ireland and Spain lost their AAA-rating 
during the aftermath of the latest financial crisis whereas Austria, France and the Netherlands 
were downgraded in early 2012. During the last two years of the sample period, Finland was 
the only country in the Eurozone (in addition to Germany) that held its triple-A rating.  
 Figure 12 shows that the yield spreads follow similar pattern in all AAA-rated 
countries during the sample period. On the other hand there can be seen clear anticipation in 
spreads of Ireland, Austria and the Netherlands before the downgrading whereas 
corresponding development cannot be observed for Spain, France and Finland. CDS prices, 
however, help to control the possible effects of anticipated idiosyncratic changes in default 
risk before the rating event.    
 Simple correlations in table 3 suggest that spreads are positively related to the risk 
aversion and uncertainty measures, the average correlation coefficients being 0,14 and 0,36, 
respectively. The correlations between investor sentiment and spreads are highest in Spain 
and Ireland and lowest in France and Austria.   
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4.3 Baseline results 
This section provides OLS estimates for risk aversion on yield spreads controlling the level 
of uncertainty. It is studied whether the risk aversion and uncertainty measures have 
explanatory power on observed yield spreads as the theoretical motivation suggests.  
 As a robustness check, I allow the fundamental part of risk premium to be time 
varying by controlling the spreads with differences in CDS prices to Germany. In that 
exercise it is assumed that CDS prices reflect only the default risk and are not affected by 
uncertainty or risk aversion (i.e. CDS is considered as an insurance).  
 In addition, the corresponding analysis is conducted with different subsamples of the 
data. Several studies (see e.g. Ureche-Rangau and Burietz, 2013, Acharya, Dreschler and 
Schnabl, 2011 and Candelon and Palm, 2010) highlight the role of the feedback loop 
between the governments and national banking sectors during the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Especially for Ireland and Spain this is relevant issue since the fiscal stance of these 
countries deteriorated significantly and rapidly, when governments attempted to save their 
banking systems during the financial crisis. This gives a rationale to examine whether the 
baseline results hold when Ireland and Spain are excluded from the sample. In addition, it is 
studied whether the results change when the crises periods (the latest financial crisis and the 
European sovereign debt crisis) are excluded. This sample period also omits downgrading 
activities. 
 
Table 4: OLS coefficients for risk aversion (VP), uncertainty (RVARF), lagged yield spread (AR(1)) and 
difference in CDS price on yield spread and corresponding p-values (based on White heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors, bolded values are statistically significant at 5 percent level) 
 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 0,08646 0,00019 0,12361 0,12087 0,00114 0,13172 0,05635 0,00366 -0,02338
(0,024821) (0,000668) (0,033883) (0,004663) (0,000763) (0,005646) (0,006138) (0,001138) (0,011748)
VP 0,00100 0,00006 0,00110 0,00062 0,00005 0,00119 0,00003 0,00002 0,00272
(0,000278) (0,00000713) (0,000182) (0,00015) (0,0000237) (0,000195) (0,000116) (0,00000743) (0,000373)
RVARF 0,00203 0,00002 0,00187 0,00150 0,00002 0,00228 -0,00019 -0,00002 0,00416
(0,000387) (0,00000666) (0,000537) (0,000141) (0,0000149) (0,000184) (0,000136) (0,0000085) (0,000629)
AR(1) 0,99203 0,98743 0,93760
(0,004832) (0,004155) (0,016344)
CDS_dif 0,00682 0,00592 0,00587
(0,00118) (0,000154) (0,001133)
Adjusted R-squared 0,11 0,98 0,73 0,07 0,97 0,65 0,01 0,88 0,58
Observations 14103 14103 7996 10996 10996 6781 9706 9706 3599
Whole sample Ireland and Spain excluded Before Lehman
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Table 3 reports the results of the regression analysis. Regression 1 corresponds to the 
equation 16 that is derived from the presented theoretical model whereas regressions 2-9 
provide robustness checks. Regressions 1-3 utilize the whole sample, regressions 4-6 
exclude Ireland and Spain and regressions 7-9 analyze the pre-crisis period (time before the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 19. September 2008). Due to unbalanced nature of the 
data, different sample periods give different weights for each country (in regressions 1-3 
Finland has the largest weight whereas in regressions 7-9 countries have almost equal 
weights).  
 The coefficients for risk aversion and uncertainty measures are generally positive 
and statistically significant. The magnitudes for the uncertainty measure on the yield spread 
are typically larger compared to the risk aversion measure (regression that do not include the 
lagged yield spread). For example regression 1 suggests that if the risk aversion measure 
increases by one standard deviation, the yield spread increases by 3,3 basis points whereas 
the corresponding number for increase in uncertainty measure is about 8,1 basis points. The 
magnitudes of both measures are larger in models which control the differences in CDS 
prices. These models, however, exclude the early and mid-2000´s from the sample. In this 
sense, the obtained larger magnitude might result from the larger variation in data. Moreover, 
when Ireland and Spain are excluded, uncertainty has not statistically significant relation on 
change in yield spread. In all specifications, the inclusion of country fixed effects does not 
change the results. 
 Descriptive evidence (see figures 10 and 11) and theoretical argument suggest that 
yield spreads and risk aversion and uncertainty measures are stationary time series.3As a 
robustness check, it is, however, examined whether the baseline result holds when the lagged 
yield spread is included to the model. In these regressions lagged spreads receive coefficients 
that are near to 1 which probably results from the small variation in daily level data. For this 
reason these regressions correspond to a model that estimates the difference in spreads. 
When the lagged spread is controlled, the risk aversion measures receives clearly smaller 
estimated coefficients compared to the regressions for spreads in levels. However, the 
coefficient for risk aversion remains to be positive and statistically significant. Moreover, 
regressions that control the lagged spreads result larger magnitudes for risk aversion 
                                                                
3 Figures 10 and 11 show that time series lack any kind of long run trend. Also from the 
theoretical long run equilibrium viewpoint it is not plausible to expect that yield spreads, 
economic uncertainty or risk aversion are non-stationary variables.   
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compared to uncertainty. It seems that a rise in sovereign risk premium is more related to 
high risk aversion than high stock market uncertainty.  
 Before the latest financial crisis there is not statistically significant relationship 
between spreads and the level of investor risk aversion and stock market uncertainty. 
However, during the pre-crisis period the relation between change in yield spread and both 
measures is statistically significant. Surprisingly, the coefficient of uncertainty measure is 
negative during this time period, which in contrast to the theoretical prediction. It seems that 
the relationship between uncertainty and sovereign risk has been different during the pre- 
and post-crisis periods, which implies changes in investor preferences and attitudes toward 
this pricing factor.      
 The effect of investor sentiment can be seen economically significant. For example 
if the risk aversion increases by one standard deviation from its average level, which is fairly 
common movement during the sample period, the yield spreads increases by 20 percent 
points. In relative terms, this increase would result over 5 percent points higher average 
sovereign borrowing costs compared to Germany for the analyzed countries. In 2008, when 
the risk aversion reached its highest levels, the average impact of the investor sentiment was 
over 40 basis points which suggests that the average costs of investor sentiment were over 
10 percent points higher compared to Germany in long term government bonds.      
 Overall, regression analysis finds that risk aversion is positively related to yield 
spreads. This result is robust in different sub-samples of the data and also when the 
assumption for constant fundamental risk is relaxed (differences in CDS prices are 
controlled).  
 Although the baseline result is in line with the theoretical prediction, the regression 
analysis is not able to detect the sign of the causality. There is a potential endogeneity issue 
that might arise, for example, from a possibility that the spreads also reflect the expectations 
on the future of the euro system. It might be the case that the yield spreads in the Eurozone´s 
sovereign debt markets affect the risk aversion and uncertainty in German stock markets. 
Next section examines the causality. 
4.4 Causality 
In order to study the direction of the causality and characterize the dynamic links between 
risk aversion, uncertainty and spreads, I turn to a simple vector autoregressive (VAR) system 
suggested by Sims (1980). VAR is a multiple equation model for joint determination of two 
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or more variables that is widely applied in macroeconometric analysis.   A restricted VAR 
might include some variables in one equation, other variables in another equation. These 
restrictions and specifications are typically derived from economic theory. An unrestricted 
VAR includes all variables in each equation and it is fully data-driven method. 
 Although the presented consumption based asset pricing model predicts that the sign 
of the causality goes from the sentiment to the spreads, not another way round, it seems 
plausible that the causality might be bidirectional. This might be the case especially during 
the European sovereign debt crisis. For this reason the analysis is conducted with 
unrestricted VAR. Moreover, reported impulse responses are based on approach suggested 
by Pesaran and Shin (1998) which is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VAR.  
 In this application pooling the countries is attractive choice because it increases the 
degree of freedom and potentially reduces the risk of overfitting. On the other hand pooling 
may introduce aggregation bias if the parameters for individual countries are heterogeneous. 
However, figure 9 show that the developments have been fairly homogeneous in all 
countries. For this reason country fixed effects and country specific coefficients are not 
included to the model.   
 VAR contains three endogenous variables; yield spread to Germany, risk aversion 
and uncertainty measures. Constant is included as an exogenous variable. Lag length is 
selected to be three by Akaike information criterion. The sample period is 2002-2014 and 
individual countries are included to the sample during the periods presented in table 3.  
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Figure 13. Impulse responses, daily frequency. 
 
Panel A in figure 13 presents the impulse responses from risk aversion (VP) and uncertainty 
(RVARF) measures to yield spread. One standard deviation shock in risk aversion increases 
yield spread by one percent (100 basis points). Qualitatively this result is in line with the 
theoretical prediction and corresponds to the findings of the regression analysis. The effect 
is gradually decreasing but it is still positive and statistically significant after 10 days. This 
finding probably reflects the importance of the lagged spread which was observed in the 
regression analysis.  
 Surprisingly, the short term effect from uncertainty shock on yield spread is negative. 
However, the effect turns to be statistically insignificant after couple of days. The sign of 
the VAR estimate is negative for the first lag and positive for second and third lags. Panel B 
suggest that the causality is indeed bidirectional during the sample period, at least in short 
run. Shock in yield spread increase risk aversion and decrease uncertainty. However, the 
magnitudes are fairly small. VAR Granger causality tests support the conclusion of 
bidirectional causality between spread and risk aversion. Uncertainty seems to Granger 
cause spreads but not another way round.  
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Due to facts that the spreads have fairly low variation in the daily level data and investor 
sentiment has been considered as a persistent variable in the literature (see e.g. Brown and 
Cliff 2005), the corresponding VAR analysis is also conducted with monthly data in order 
to study the long run effects. 
   
 
Figure 14. Impulse responses, monthly frequency. 
 
Figure 14 shows that shocks in both risk aversion and uncertainty measures have positive 
impact on spreads. The effects are statistically significant after two and four months for risk 
aversion and uncertainty, respectively. The magnitudes of impulse responses are clearly 
higher compared to the previous analysis with daily level data. VAR Granger causality tests 
find that both risk aversion and uncertainty Granger causes spreads whereas spreads do not 
Granger cause risk aversion or uncertainty. 
 Overall, the VAR analyses find that shock in risk aversion increases yield spread. 
For uncertainty the evidence is somewhat mixed; in the short run the obtained impulse 
response on spreads is negative whereas the long run analysis results positive impact which 
in line with the theory. Moreover, the analysis suggests that the sentiment measures are not 
completely exogenous for yield spread in short run but the bidirectional causality does not 
hold with monthly data frequency. 
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4.5 Forecasting ability of the investor sentiment model 
This section examines whether the risk aversion and uncertainty measures can be utilized to 
predict sovereign yield spreads. First I estimate a simple AR(1) model for yield spreads. This 
model is a benchmark that is compared to the model that includes lagged yield spread, risk 
aversion and uncertainty measures. More formally, the estimated benchmark model is: 
    
    𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡      (17) 
 
 where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a yield spread to Germany in country i at time t, 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is a corresponding yield 
spread in previous time period, c is a constant (country fixed effects are not included) and 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. This simple AR(1) has fairly good in-sample accuracy, the adjusted R-
squared being 0,72 during pre-crisis period and 0,98 during the whole sample period. The 
competing sentiment model is: 
  
   𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑝𝑉𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑝𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  (18) 
 
Where  𝑉𝑃𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐹𝑡−1 are the risk aversion and uncertainty measures at time 𝑡 − 1.  
The forecasting horserace is conducted with both daily and monthly data frequencies. For 
daily frequency, the evaluation of the predictive accuracy for both models is based on the 
one-year-ahead performance. The parameters (𝑐, 𝑝𝑦, 𝑝𝑉𝑃, 𝑝𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐹) are estimated by using 
data for two years before the forecasted period. For monthly data the corresponding 
estimation and forecasting periods are three and two years, respectively. 
 The forecasting models are compared by using two alternative measures of 
forecasting accuracy, namely root mean squared error (RMSPE) and mean absolute 
percentage error (MAPE). Due to fact that all series are on the same scale and spreads are 
typically greater than zero MAPE is likely the most appropriate evaluation measure in this 
application (for comparison of the evaluation measures see e.g. Hyndman and Koehler, 
2006). 
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Table 5: Out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of the benchmark and sentiment models, daily frequency, whole 
panel 
 
 
Table 5 reports the results from the forecasting horserace between the sentiment and 
benchmark models in daily frequency for all countries. In terms of RMSPE, both models 
provide clearly more accurate forecasts during the pre-crisis period (in 2005-2007) 
compared to the crisis period (in 2008-2011). In contrast, MAPEs are higher during the pre-
crisis period and decrease significantly during the crisis period.  Improvement in accuracy 
illustrates how much better (positive value) or worse (negative value) the sentiment model 
is compared to the benchmark in percentage terms according to both accuracy measure.  
 Overall, the results are somewhat mixed and the differences between forecasting 
abilities seem to be fairly small. In some years the sentiment model is more accurate whereas 
in other years its performance is worse. The results suggest that before and after the latest 
financial crisis the benchmark and sentiment model have almost equal accuracy when 
Forecasted Year Model RMSPE MAPE
2005 Benchmark 0,024 53,989
Sentiment 0,023 52,939
Improvement in accuracy (%) 0,525 1,943
2006 Benchmark 0,022 51,667
Sentiment 0,022 52,131
Improvement in accuracy (%) 0,082 -0,897
2007 Benchmark 0,029 31,474
Sentiment 0,028 31,000
Improvement in accuracy (%) 1,447 1,504
2008 Benchmark 0,067 16,658
Sentiment 0,059 15,574
Improvement in accuracy (%) 12,981 6,504
2009 Benchmark 0,055 6,416
Sentiment 0,057 6,489
Improvement in accuracy (%) -4,308 -1,148
2010 Benchmark 0,035 8,057
Sentiment 0,035 7,895
Improvement in accuracy (%) 0,231 2,012
2011 Benchmark 0,051 7,197
Sentiment 0,056 7,249
Improvement in accuracy (%) -11,067 -0,727
pre-crisis average Benchmark 0,025 45,710
Sentiment 0,024 45,357
Improvement in accuracy (%) 0,685 0,850
crisis average Benchmark 0,052 9,582
Sentiment 0,052 9,302
Improvement in accuracy (%) -0,541 1,660
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predicting next day´s yield spreads. However, in 2008, the sentiment model clearly 
outperforms the benchmark by providing 13 (RMSPE) and 6,5 (MAPE) percent point more 
accurate forecasts compared to the benchmark. 
 The relatively small differences between the models might arise from the small 
variation in both yield spreads and sentiment measures in daily level data. Alternative 
explanation could be that the relationship between sentiment and yield spreads is time-
varying. Notwithstanding, it seems that the sentiment model offers more accurate predictions 
during the periods of high risk aversion. In terms of MAPE, the correlation between accuracy 
improvement of the sentiment model and standard deviation of risk aversion measure being 
about 0,66 during the 2005-2011 period. 
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Table 6: Out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of the benchmark and sentiment models, daily frequency, 
individual countries 
 
 
Country Forecasted Year Model RMSPE MAPE
Austria 2006 Benchmark 0,03 75,05
Sentiment 0,03 73,29
Improvement in accuracy (%) 1,43 2,34
2010 Benchmark 0,05 7,52
Sentiment 0,04 7,12
Improvement in accuracy (%) 0,62 5,41
Finland 2006 Benchmark 0,03 73,64
Sentiment 0,03 72,01
Improvement in accuracy (%) -0,60 2,22
2010 Benchmark 0,04 14,87
Sentiment 0,04 14,48
Improvement in accuracy (%) 2,69 2,59
France 2006 Benchmark 0,01 18,99
Sentiment 0,01 20,41
Improvement in accuracy (%) -1,24 -7,48
2010 Benchmark 0,02 4,40
Sentiment 0,02 4,57
Improvement in accuracy (%) -1,40 -3,86
Ireland 2006 Benchmark 0,01 23,52
Sentiment 0,01 23,57
Improvement in accuracy (%) -1,17 -0,23
2008 Benchmark 0,02 2,97
Sentiment 0,02 2,96
Improvement in accuracy (%) 3,77 0,36
Netherlands 2006 Benchmark 0,01 25,80
Sentiment 0,01 28,51
Improvement in accuracy (%) -47,75 -10,53
2010 Benchmark 0,02 5,46
Sentiment 0,02 5,31
Improvement in accuracy (%) 0,32 2,65
Spain 2006 Benchmark 0,03 80,83
Sentiment 0,03 88,62
Improvement in accuracy (%) -8,31 -9,63
2008 Benchmark 0,10 25,94
Sentiment 0,09 24,91
Improvement in accuracy (%) 14,97 3,98
Average pre-crisis (2006) Benchmark 0,02 49,64
Sentiment 0,02 51,07
Improvement in accuracy (%) -9,61 -3,88
crisis (2008 and 2010) Benchmark 0,04 10,19
Sentiment 0,04 9,89
Improvement in accuracy (%) 3,49 1,85
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When the comparison of the models is based on the evidence from the individual countries, 
the results are qualitatively similar to the previous analysis. Table 6 shows that before the 
crisis, in 2006, the benchmark outperforms the sentiment model in almost all countries. In 
2008 and 2010 the sentiment model is clearly more accurate, France being the only 
exception. Compared to the previous analysis, the magnitudes of the difference between the 
models are clearly larger. In 2006, the sentiment model performs 3,9 (MAPE) to 9,6 
(RMSPE) percent points worse compared to the benchmark. In contrast, during and after the 
crisis period (in 2008 and 2010), the sentiment model outperforms the benchmark by 
providing 3,5 (RMSPE) to 1,9 (MAPE) percent point more accurate forecasts.  
 It seems that the results are qualitatively similar for the all AAA-rated Eurozone 
countries. However, there exists significant heterogeneity in the magnitudes among the 
countries. In terms of RSMPE, the sentiment model offers clearly better prediction for Spain 
in 2008 (about 15 percent), whereas for Netherlands the benchmark model is exceptionally 
more accurate in 2006. These differences might result from the differences for example in 
bond liquidity, market structure, transaction costs or domestic investor preferences. The 
analysis of these issues is, however, left for future studies.    
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Table 7: Out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of the benchmark and sentiment models, monthly frequency, 
whole panel 
 
 
Table 7 reports the results of two-year-ahead forecasts for all countries with monthly 
frequency. The results suggest that the sentiment model clearly outperforms the benchmark. 
In contrast to the previous analyses with daily frequency, this observation holds for all 
forecasted periods. As with daily frequency, the improvement in forecast accuracy of the 
sentiment model is still the largest during the crisis period. During the 2005-2011 period the 
sentiment model has 16,2 (MAPE) to 4,7 (RMSPE) percent point better out-of-sample 
predictive ability compared to the benchmark. It seems that when the forecasting period is 
extended from daily to monthly level, the predictive power of investor sentiment and 
economic uncertainty on yield spreads increases significantly. 
4.6 Discussion 
Regression analysis finds that the risk aversion and uncertainty measures are positively 
related with yield spreads. During the times with low investor risk appetite and high stock 
market uncertainty, sovereign risk premiums typically rise in the triple-A-rated Eurozone 
Forecasted Period Model RMSPE MAPE
2005-2006 Benchmark 0,03 2,52
Sentiment 0,03 2,29
Improvement in accuracy (%) 0,29 9,13
2006-2007 Benchmark 0,02 5,38
Sentiment 0,03 2,94
Improvement in accuracy (%) -8,16 45,35
2007-2008 Benchmark 0,11 29,12
Sentiment 0,09 27,36
Improvement in accuracy (%) 10,29 6,05
2008-2009 Benchmark 0,17 23,93
Sentiment 0,15 20,29
Improvement in accuracy (%) 13,29 15,19
2009-2010 Benchmark 0,14 28,81
Sentiment 0,13 23,71
Improvement in accuracy (%) 11,32 17,71
2010-2011 Benchmark 0,11 15,42
Sentiment 0,11 14,82
Improvement in accuracy (%) 0,99 3,88
Average Benchmark 0,10 17,53
Sentiment 0,09 15,24
Improvement in accuracy (%) 4,67 16,22
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countries. It seems that the relationship between the spreads and risk aversion is persistent 
and it can be observed during both pre- and post-crisis periods, i.e. in both turbulent and 
serene market environments. This result is robust for the exclusion of the countries that 
experienced banking crisis during the late 2000´s and for the periods when rating events did 
not occur.    
 The estimated magnitudes for the measures suggest that the stock market uncertainty 
is probably more important factor for yield spreads than investors´ risk-appetite. However, 
change in yield spread seem to be more related to the level of risk aversion than uncertainty. 
Before the latest financial crisis, uncertainty has negative correlation with spreads which is 
in contrast to the theoretical prediction. It seems that during the pre-crisis periods, the 
uncertainty driven demand for safe assets actually converged the yields in the triple-A-
tranche. During the crisis period uncertainty became a pricing factor that have had a positive 
impact on sovereign risk premiums. This suggests that investor preferences in government 
debt markets have changed during the crisis period. 
 Regressions that control the changes in expected default risk compared to Germany 
(difference in CDS prices) confirm the finding that there are developments in sovereign risk 
premiums that cannot be justified with economic fundamentals and that these developments 
are correlated with investor sentiment. 
 Qualitatively the baseline result from the regression analysis is in line with previous 
studies on European sovereign debt markets. For example Arghyrou, Kontonikas, 2012; 
Bernoth, Erdogan, 2012; Gerlach et al, 2010; Favero et al, 2010; Favero and Missale (2012) 
emphasize the role of global risk aversion in the widening of government bond spreads 
especially during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis period. Moreover, Codogno et al. 
(2003) and Geyer et al. (2004) find that global risk aversion impacts yield spreads across 
EMU countries already before the crisis period. 
 The VAR analysis finds that there are causal relationship between yield spread and 
risk aversion, i.e. increase in risk aversion leads to higher yield spread. The magnitude of 
this effect is clearly higher compared to the OLS estimates. For uncertainty, the impulse 
responses are different in daily and monthly level analysis. The daily level analysis finds 
that increase in uncertainty decreases the yield spread whereas monthly level data provides 
opposite conclusion. In both analyses uncertainty Granger causes the yield spreads and not 
vice versa. In daily level analysis the causality between risk aversion and yield spread is 
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bidirectional. However, the impact of yield spread on risk aversion seem to be fairly small. 
In monthly level analysis the causality goes only from risk aversion to spreads.  
 Last, it was studied whether the so called sentiment model that contains information 
on risk aversion and uncertainty can provide better forecasts compared to simple AR(1) 
model. It seems that the sentiment model provides better predictions for the next day´s yield 
spreads only during the turbulent times. With monthly data frequency the sentiment model 
outperformed the AR(1) also during the pre-crisis periods. The results suggest that risk 
aversion and uncertainty have significant long run predictive power on spreads whereas in 
short run these measures do not provide valuable information for the forecasts. This result 
might arise from the fact in daily level data there are relatively small variation in spreads 
and the measures. Alternatively, the difference between the short and long run results might 
relate to the long run nature of the investor sentiment and arbitrage forces.  According to 
Brown and Cliff (2005) the fact that sentiment appears to have little predictive power for 
near-term returns in empirical studies is probably because the importance of sentiment builds 
over time and short-run predictability would lead to a simple trading strategy generating 
abnormal returns.  
 Overall, the empirical analyses shows that investor risk appetite drives yield spreads 
in the triple A-rated Eurozone countries. This relationship seems to be robust and persistent 
during the sample period. The importance of the risk aversion as a pricing factor increases 
in the longer time horizon. For uncertainty economic theory suggests corresponding positive 
effect on risk premium. However, the obtained empirical evidence is mixed. It seems that 
the effect of uncertainty on sovereign risk premiums might be time varying.  
 Empirical studies that examine the impact of investor sentiment on asset prices face 
significant challenges in terms of identification; how to make sure that the observed price 
movements are related or caused by the investor sentiment or not just by some other factor. 
In order to overcome this problem, this study focuses on the safe assets which should have 
almost equal default risk. The rational arguments suggests that the fundamental based risk 
premiums between Germany and other triple-A-rated Eurozone countries should be 
relatively small and time invariant, probably driven mainly by the differences in liquidity. If 
an investor holds a bond to the maturity the expected payoff pattern should be similar for all 
bonds. Presented theoretical model suggests that in a case of twin-like-bonds with constant 
fundamental based risk premium, the yield spread should depend only on changes in 
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economic uncertainty and risk aversion (if the fundamental based risk premium is zero 
(bonds are “true twins”) then the yield spread should always be zero).   
 However, the identification assumption can be questioned. It is plausible that 
especially during the financial and sovereign debt crisis a large share of investors disagree 
with the rating agency about the credit quality and require significant risk premium for the 
government bond, which drives the price down and increases the yield spread to Germany. 
For this reason it was studied whether the obtained baseline results hold when the 
identification assumption is relaxed. The possible time variation in default risk was 
controlled with CDS prices, which did not change the baseline results. In this sense it 
plausible to assume that the analysis was able identify the variation in government bond 
yields that was not related to the changes in economic or fiscal fundamentals. 
 Previous literature on determinants of sovereign yield spreads typically measures 
investor sentiment with VIX-index. As discussed in section 3, a stock market volatility 
index, however, harbors information on both risk aversion (sentiment) and uncertainty. By 
using the presented decomposition technique, this study is able to separate these factors for 
the European financial markets. However, the definition of investor sentiment is somewhat 
ambiguous and the measurement of the sentiment phenomena continues to be debated in the 
literature. Although, the analysis finds that the investor risk appetite has positive effect on 
yield spreads which is in line with theoretical prediction, I cannot rule out the possibility that 
the results are driven for example by the changes in other dimensions of investor preferences. 
It might be the case that investors have preferred German bonds due to reason that randomly 
coincide, but is not causally related, with risk aversion during the sample period.  
 The obvious disadvantage of the identification strategy is relatively low variation in 
the explanatory variable. Due to safe haven status, the yield spreads in the triple A-tranche 
government bonds have been fairly low even during the turbulent times. This low variation 
results low estimated magnitudes for the effect of investor sentiment. Although the evidence 
is based on the safest government bonds in the Eurozone, it is plausible to think that the 
results can be generalized to other assets as well. If the effect of investor sentiment on asset 
prices can be observed in the assets that are default risk free from the historical viewpoint, 
it is likely that the effect is clearly larger in riskier assets or asset classes. For example, the 
presented theoretical model suggests that the risk aversion enforces the fundamental based 
risk premium in a non-linear manner. 
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5 Conclusions 
This master thesis examines the question that has been the subject of considerable debate in 
the finance literature; how investor sentiment affects asset prices. The empirical evidence is 
based on the sovereign yield spreads between Germany and other triple-A-rated Eurozone 
countries.  
 This study utilizes fairly recent and novel measure for investor risk aversion, the 
equity variance premium that is obtained with a decomposition method developed by 
Bekaert and Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013). The variance premium for European financial 
markets is defined as a difference between the squared VDAX index and an estimate of the 
conditional variance of the German stock market, the DAX index. The decomposition of the 
volatility index provides measures for investor risk appetite and stock market uncertainty. 
During the analyzed time period, these measures are highly correlated with the observed 
flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity tendencies that are traditionally associated with 
changes in investor sentiment in the market place.     
 The presented simple asset pricing model suggests that when the fundamental based 
risk premium between two risky assets is constant, the yield spread is determined by the risk 
aversion and uncertainty. The empirical strategy is based on the assumption that the 
difference in default risk premium to Germany is time invariant in the triple-A-tranche. 
Compared to the bulk of previous studies on the determinants of sovereign yield spreads, 
this “twin-like-bond” design enables to use higher data frequency and improves the 
identification of the effect of the investor risk appetite. Moreover, previous studies that rely 
on market based measures typically use volatility index as a proxy for investor sentiment. 
Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that volatility index harbors information on 
both risk aversion and uncertainty. The applied VDAX decomposition provides a way to 
examine the effects of these factors separately.  
 The main finding of this study is that the sovereign yield spreads are positively 
related to the level of risk aversion. During the times of low investor risk appetite the 
sovereign yield spreads to Germany increase. This finding holds for both pre- and post-crisis 
periods. Moreover, the VAR analysis suggests that this relationship is causal; changes in 
yield spreads are caused by investor risk aversion. In addition, it seems that the risk aversion 
and uncertainty measures have significant predictive power on next month´s yield spreads. 
The positive relationship between investor risk appetite and asset prices, especially in the 
US stock markets, is well documented by the previous research. This master thesis 
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contributes to the existing literature by providing new evidence that the sentiment 
phenomena can be observed also in the asset class that is often considered as a safe haven in 
the financial markets. This finding is line in with the studies that argue that the sentiment 
was important factor for sovereign yield divergence, especially in the peripheral countries, 
during the latest European debt crisis. However, this study finds that this relationship is 
persistent and it can be observed during the pre-crisis period and also in the triple-A-tranche.    
 The estimated magnitude for the effect of the investor sentiment is economically 
significant from the sovereign borrowing viewpoint. If the risk aversion measure increases 
by one standard deviation (which quite common movement during the sample period), triple-
A rated Euro-sovereigns paid 5 percent points higher borrowing costs in long maturity debt 
claims compared to Germany. During the highest risk aversion in the crisis period, the 
corresponding average effect on relative borrowing costs is about 10 percent. This result 
suggests that in 2008 the Finnish government, for example, paid additional borrowing costs 
of 240 million euros that cannot be justified by increased sovereign default risk or other 
economic fundamentals. 
 The practical implications of the results are threefold. First, governments or 
companies that raise funding should acknowledge that the way how investors value the debt 
claim (or stock) and hence, what the funding costs would be, may largely depend on the 
phase of the sentiment cycle. When investors are highly risk averse, the required risk 
premiums might be clearly higher compared to the level that results from the fundamental 
based valuation, even when the issuer is financially in a good shape. Second, if the asset 
prices have tendency to return to the fundamental value when the high risk aversion wanes, 
the perception of the sentiment cycles might provide tempting investment opportunities for 
rational investor also in the relatively safe asset classes. Third, if the investor sentiment has 
profound and persistent impacts on asset prices, the burst of sentiment cycle might enforce 
financial crisis in a self-full filling manner (intuitively this kind of phenomena correspond 
to the bank run dynamics suggested by Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). In this situation fund 
raisers cannot improve their position in the financial markets by improving their 
fundamentals (for example government cannot decrease the risk premiums by cutting down 
the budget deficits) and hence, some kind of market intervention might be justified. For 
example Bekaert and Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) find that a lax monetary policy decreases 
both risk aversion and uncertainty.        
 This paper concludes that risk aversion has significant negative effect on asset prices 
also in the market segment of safe havens. However, more careful analyzes for the difference 
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between long and short run relationship, time varying nature of the effect of the uncertainty 
factor and sources for heterogeneity in risk aversion sensitivity among the countries might 
be useful avenues for the future research. This kind of analyzes could provide new insights 
on the functioning of the financial markets. 
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